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Abstract 
The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of 
the 
expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical 
framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. 
In 
the first case, the exporting country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening 
in 
the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm 
playing the role of “pure middleman” in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned 
marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that under 
all 
three scenarios, if perfect competition is assumed when market imperfections exist, the impact of 
a 
tariff reduction on prices and volume traded is overestimated. A ranking of the size of such 
distortions in the three cases analyzed is provided. Finally, it is proved that when a private firm 
exerts monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, both the importing and the 
exporting 
countries may well be better off if, rather than making a move towards trade liberalization, the 
importing country “compensates” the exporting country by means of a direct transfer. 
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The paper shows how analyses assuming perfect competition can yield a distorted estimation of 
the 
expected effects of a trade liberalization when market imperfections exist. The analytical 
framework adopted is very simple and three extreme imperfect market structures are considered. 
In 
the first case, the exporting country maximizes its producer and consumer surplus by intervening 
in the world market. The second market imperfection considered is the existence of a private firm 
playing the role of “pure middleman” in the world market. Then the case of a producer-owned 
marketing board which is granted exclusive export authority is addressed. It is shown that under 
all 
three scenarios, if perfect competition is assumed when market imperfections exist, the impact of 
a 
tariff reduction on prices and volume traded is overestimated. A ranking of the size of such 
distortions in the three cases analyzed is provided. Finally, it is proved that when a private firm 
exerts monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, both the importing and the 
exporting 
countries may well be better off if, rather than making a move towards trade liberalization, the 
importing country “compensates” the exporting country by means of a direct transfer. 
Mainly as a result of the Uruguay round of the GATT, since the late 1980s there has been a 
marked increase in the literature pertaining to the effects produced by liberalizing agricultural 
trade 
(Anania). Most analyses are empirical and assume perfect competition in both domestic and 
international markets. However, international agricultural trading occurs in markets where the 
holders of market power are particularly active. 
This paper investigates the effects of a trade liberalization assuming imperfect competition 
in world markets and compares the results with those obtained under the hypothesis that perfect 
competition occurs. Three extreme imperfect market structures are analyzed in a very simple 
analytical framework. Though the aim of the paper is clearly explorative, its findings do in fact 
provide some useful indications regarding the distortions which result from assuming perfect 
competition in cases where this hypothesis does not hold. 
In the first section, the relevance of market imperfections in agricultural world trade is 
briefly discussed. The two-country model described in the second section combines both a 
graphical and algebraic approach in assessing the impact of a trade liberalization in three 
imperfect 
world market scenarios: (i) when the exporting country intervenes in world markets in order to 
maximize its consumer and producer surplus; (ii) when a firm exists in the international market 
acting as a “pure middleman” which maximizes its own profits; and (iii) when a producer-owned 
marketing board is granted exclusive authority to export. The last section gives a summary of the 
principal results obtained. 
Agricultural Trade and Imperfect Markets 
Almost all countries, and in particular the major traders, do, in one way or another, 
intervene in international markets. In many countries, whether importing or exporting, developed 
or 
developing, effective marketing boards and State Trading Enterprises (STEs) exist (Ackerman 
and 
Dixit; Veeman, Fulton and Larue). Examples include the Canadian Wheat Board, the Australian 
Wheat Board, the Japanese Food Agency, the New Zealand Dairy Board, as well as many STEs 
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active in developing countries. 
Around about the beginning of the 1990s, 80% of world cereals exports was controlled by 
just six multinational firms, while four firms controlled 80% of the trade in oilseeds; if 
commodities exported by developing countries are also considered, there is no significant change 
in the scenario: four firms controlled 60% of the trade in sugar; three 75% of the trade in cocoa; 
three 
80% of that in tea (Scoppola, p. 64). 
The effects of different market imperfections on international agricultural trade have been 
analysed both from theoretical and empirical points of view. Theoretical analyses include those 
by 
Bieri and Schmitz; Dixit and Josling; Just, Schmitz and Zilbermann; McCalla; McCalla and 
Josling; McCorriston and MacLaren; Sarris and Schmitz; Schmitz, McCalla, Mitchell and Carter; 
and Veeman, Fulton and Larue. Empirical analyses, involving a wide range of market 
imperfections, have been carried out, among the others, by Abbott; Alaouze, Watson and 
Sturgess; 
Carter and Schmitz; Francois, McDonald and Nordstrom; Hertel, Brockmeier and Swaminathan; 
Karp and McCalla; Kawaguchi, Suzuki and Kaiser; Kolstad and Burris; Lanclos, Hertel and 
Devadoss; McCorriston; Paarlberg and Abbott; Schmitz, McCalla, Mitchell and Carter; 
Swaminathan, Hertel and Brockmeier; and Thursby and Thursby. 
Market imperfections can affect the impact of a trade liberalization on prices, volume traded 
and welfares. Since current WTO negotiations could bring about a significant reduction in the 
barriers to agricultural trading, it is of interest to ascertain whether or not the attempts to evaluate 
the effects of an agricultural trade liberalization are biased, and the direction of such bias. 
The analytical framework 
A very simple partial equilibrium framework with one commodity, two large countries, 
fixed exchange rates, zero transportation costs and linear supply and demand curves has been 
used 
in developing the analysis. It is assumed, moreover, that perfect competition holds on the 
domestic 
markets. 
Country A is a tariff-imposing importing country and country B the exporting country. 
Let XA(q) and XB(q) be the inverse excess demand and supply functions of countries A and 
B respectively, with ∂XA/∂q = XA’ < 0 , ∂XB/∂q = XB’ > 0 , and q the volume of trade. 
Let us first derive the effects produced by a trade liberalization in the “reference” scenario, 
i.e. where perfect competition prevails in all markets. This particular case is shown in Figure 1, 
where XA is the inverse excess demand of A, XB is the inverse excess supply of B, and t = AB is 
the per unit import tariff. XA’’ is the tariff-inclusive excess demand of A expressed as function of 
the price in the exporting country. When A imposes the tariff, the volume of trade is qPC/t , A’s 
domestic price is PA 
PC/t , and B’s is PB 
PC/t . The shaded areas represent the “gains from trade” of A 
and B, i.e. the increases in the closed-economy producer and consumer surplus due to 
international 
trading (assuming that the tariff revenue is redistributed to producers and consumers in country A 
as a lump sum transfer). If a trade liberalization takes place, the volume of trade increases to qPC 
and the price in the two countries equals PPC . 
The market equilibrium condition under perfect competition is given by: 
[1] XA(q) - t - XB(q) = 0 . 
By taking the total differential of [1] we obtain: 
[2] XA’ dq - dt - XB’ dq = 0 . 
The impact on prices and volume traded of a tariff change can be described as follows: 4 
[3] [dq/dt]PC = 1 / [XA’ - XB’] < 0 , 
[4] [dPA/dt]PC = XA’ dq/dt > 0 , and 
[5] [dPB/dt]PC = XB’ dq/dt < 0 , 
where Pi is the equilibrium price in country i. 
The producer and consumer surplus of A and B are given by: 
q 
[6] WA = WA 
AUT + ∫ XA(z) dz - q [XA(q) - t] , 
0 
q 
[7] WB = WB 
AUT + q XB(q) - ∫ XB(z) dz , 
0 
where WA 
AUT and WB 
AUT are the closed-economy consumer and producer surpluses of countries A 
and B, respectively, and the remaining terms in [6] and [7] are the “gains from trade”. The 
welfare 
effects of a tariff change are given by: 
[8] [dWA/dt]PC = [t - q XA’] dq/dt + q , and 
[9] [dWB/dt]PC = q XB’ dq/dt < 0 . 
While the welfare of the tariff-imposing country will, in general, either increase or decrease 
as the tariff decreases, the welfare of the exporting country will definitely increase. 
Case I: the exporting country maximizing its producer and consumer surplus 
The first case of market imperfection to be discussed is where the exporting country 
(country B) intervenes in order to maximize its consumer and producer surplus, which is assumed 
to include the export tax revenue, redistributed to consumers and producers as a lump sum 
transfer. 
The volume of trade is obtained by solving the problem faced by country B: 
q 
[10] max WB = WB 




is country B’s closed economy producer and consumer surplus. Hence, the volume 
traded which maximizes WB is such that 
[11] ∂ WB /∂q = XA(q) - t + q XA’ - XB(q) = 0 . 
As a result, the optimal export tax is given by 
[12] τ = - q XA’ . 
B maximizes its consumer and producer surplus by exporting up to the point where its 
marginal export revenue [XA(q) - t + q XA’] equals its marginal export social cost [XB(q)]. The 
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marginal export social cost is defined as the sum of the domestic consumer welfare losses and the 
increase in producer costs which result from a marginal increase in exports. In Figure 2 the marginal export revenue curve of B when A imposes an import tariff is given by XA 
**; the 
equilibrium condition [11] is satisfied in point E. The volume of trade is qMS/t, the prices in 
countries A and B are respectively given by PA 
MS/t , and PB 
MS/t . The import tariff of A is GH and 
the export tariff of B is equal to HE. 
If A unilaterally eliminates its import tariff, the marginal export revenue curve of country B 
becomes XA 
* ; the equilibrium condition is now satisfied in D. The volume traded increases to qMS , 
the export tax is now equal to FD and the prices in the two countries are PA 
MS and PB 
MS, 
respectively. 
When the exporting country exercises market power to maximize its producer and consumer 
surplus, an elimination of the tariff by the importing country has a smaller impact in terms of the 
changes both in prices (PB 
MS PB 
MS/t is less than PPC PB 
PC/t , and PA 
MS PA 
MS/t is less than PPC PA 
PC/t ), 
and in the volume of trade (qMS/t qMS is less than qPC/t qPC). This is because the marginal export 
revenue curves of country B (XA 
* 
and XA 
**) are steeper than the excess demand curves of country A 
in the two scenarios (XA and XA’’). 
The same result can be proved by taking the total differential of [11]. By doing so, under the 
assumption that the excess demand and supply functions are linear, we obtain: 
[13] [dq/dt]MS = 1 / [2 XA’ - XB’] < 0 , 
and the following condition holds: 
[14] 0 > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC , 
from whence: 
[15] [dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > 0 , and 
[16] 0 > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC . 
Hence, when the exporting country exerts market power to maximize its producer and 
consumer surplus, a movement toward trade liberalization by the importing country has a smaller 
impact on prices and volume traded than it would do when perfect competition obtains. 
Case II: the “pure middleman” case 
The second imperfect market structure involves the case where a private firm acts as an 
international intermediary between the two countries and exerts both monopoly and monopsony 
power in the world market (while domestic markets remain perfectly competitive). 
Assuming that transaction costs are nil, the profit maximization problem of the firm can be 
stated as follows: 
[17] max π = q [XA(q) - t - XB(q)] . q 
The volume traded will be such that 
[18] ∂π/∂q = XA(q) - t - XB(q) + q XA’ - q XB’ = 0 . 
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The firm maximizes its profits by buying from B and selling to A a quantity such that its 
marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. This case is shown in Figure 3, where X** 
A is the firm 
marginal revenue and X* 
B is its marginal cost. Equilibrium condition [18] is satisfied in C; the 
volume traded is now equal to qPM/t, prices in A and B equal PA 
PM/t and PB 
PM/t , and the firm per unit 
profit equals HE. If A eliminates the tariff, the firm’s marginal cost becomes X* 
A and the 
equilibrium condition is satisfied in point F; the volume of trade increases to qPM, country A's 
price 
becomes PA 
PM, country B's PB 
PM, and the firm per unit profit DM, which is greater than HE, the per 
unit profit under the tariff. 
The price and volume of trade changes due to a trade liberalization in this case are smaller 
than those occurring under perfect competition, and are also smaller than those occurring when 
the 
exporting country exerts market power to maximize its producer and consumer surplus. This is 
because (i) the marginal revenue curve of the firm is steeper than the excess demand curve of A, 
and (ii) the marginal cost curve is steeper than the excess supply curve of B. 
These results can be easily proved by using some algebra. By taking the total differential of 
[18] we obtain: 
[19] [dq/dt]PM = 1/ [2 (XA’ - XB’)] < 0 , and 
[20] 0 > [dq/dt]PM > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC , from whence 
[21] [dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > [dPA/dt]PM > 0 , 
[22] 0 > [dPB/dt]PM > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC . 
Not only we find that the impact of a trade liberalization on volume traded and equilibrium 
prices is in this case smaller than that occurring under perfect competition, but it is also smaller 
than that taking place in the market imperfection structure considered above. 
As one can expect, the profits of the firm acting as a “pure middleman” in the market will 
always increase as the importing country reduces the tariff: 
[23] [dπ/dt] = [XA(q) - t - XB(q)] dq/dt - 1/2 < 0 . 
The impact of a tariff reduction on the welfare of country B is given by: 
[24] [dWB/dt]PM = q XB’ dq/dt < 0 , with 
[25] 0 > [dWB/dt]PM > [dWB/dt]PC . 
Hence, when a firm acting as a “pure middleman” in the world market exists, a trade 
liberalization has an impact on the exporting country’s welfare smaller than that which would 
occur 
in a perfect competition scenario. 
Finally, both countries might well be better off if, rather than abolishing the tariff, A were to compensate B through a direct welfare transfer. This is the case, for example, of the specific 
market 
represented in Figure 3, where country A’s losses due to the trade liberalization (area PA 
PMNHI 
minus area LMN) are in fact greater than country B’s gains (area PB 
PMDEpB 
PM/t). Hence, both 
countries would be better off if A, rather than eliminating the tariff, were to compensate B with a 
direct welfare transfer greater than PB 
PMDEpB 
PM/t and less than PA 
PMNHI minus LMN. 
The necessary and sufficient condition whereby the two countries are both better off when 
A, rather than eliminating the tariff, directly compensates B by means of a proper welfare 
transfer, 
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is given by: 
[26] d[WA + WB] / dt > 0 , or 
[27] q > [XA(q) – XB(q)] / [2 (XB’ – XA’)] . 
Case III: a producer-owned marketing board with exclusive export authority 
The third imperfect market structure considered is that where in the exporting country a 
producer-owned marketing board has been granted exclusive export authority; this allows the 
marketing board to exert market power in the world market (while domestic markets remain 
perfectly competitive). 
Let Q be the quantity produced in country B and SB(Q) the inverse domestic supply 
function, with ∂SB/∂Q = SB’ > 0. In equilibrium, 
[28] PB = XB(q) = SB(Q) . 
From [28] the quantity produced in country B as a function of the quantity exported can be 
derived: 
[29] Q(q) = S-1 
B [ XB(q) ] , with 
[30] 0 ≤ Q’ = ∂Q /∂q ≤ 1 .1 
Being the marketing board owned by country B’s producers, we assume that it acts with the 




[31] max  Γ  = q [XA(q) - t - XB(q)] + XB(q) Q(q) - ∫ SB(z) dz - FC . 
q 0 
where the four addenda in [31] are, respectively: the profits made by the marketing board; 
producer 
revenue; variable and fixed production costs. It is assumed that the marketing board pays 
producers 
the domestic market equilibrium price and distributes its profits to its owners, producers in 
country 
B. The volume exported by the marketing board which will maximize producer profits will be 
such that 
[32] ∂Γ/∂q = XA(q) - t - XB(q) + q XA’ - q XB’ + XB’Q(q) = 0 . 
The marketing board maximizes producer profits by exporting to country A a quantity such 
that producer marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This case is shown in Figure 4, where gross 
producer profits2 are given by the sum of the shaded areas. The equilibrium condition given in 
[32] 
is satisfied in point D, where XA 
** 
is [XA(q) - t + qXA’] and XB 
** is [XB(q) + q XB’ - XB’Q(q)]. XB 
** 
1 A change of the volume exported is always associated to a smaller change, in the same direction, of the quantity 
produced; in fact, the change in the quantity exported is equal to the sum of the changes in domestic production and 
consumption, in absolute values. 
2 Gross producer profits are profits plus fixed production costs. 
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intercept and slope are both smaller than those of XB 
* , the marginal revenue curve of the profit 
maximizing private firm considered in the previous case.3 In Figure 5 the market equilibrium 
when 
A eliminates the tariff is represented. The equilibrium condition is satisfied in point C; volume of 
trade increases to qMB, prices in the two countries become PA 
MB and PB 
MB, production in country B 
expands to QMB and the per unit profit of the marketing board to EC (from HD). 
The price and volume of trade changes due to a trade liberalization are in this case smaller 
than those occurring under perfect competition or when the exporting country exerts market 
power 
to maximize its producer and consumer surplus, and larger than those which occur when a private 
firm exists which is able to act as a “pure middleman” on the world market. In fact, by taking the 
total differential of [32], and recalling that Q’ cannot exceed 1, we obtain: 
[33] [dq/dt]MB = 1/ [2 (XA’ - XB’) + XB’Q’] < 0 , from whence 
[34] 0 > [dq/dt]PM > [dq/dt]MB > [dq/dt]MS > [dq/dt]PC , 
[35] [dPA/dt]PC > [dPA/dt]MS > [dPA/dt]MB > [dPA/dt]PM > 0 , 
[36] 0 > [dPB/dt]PM > [dPB/dt]MB > [dPB/dt]MS > [dPB/dt]PC . 
Producer profits in the exporting country increase as the importing country reduces the 
tariff: 
[37] [dΓ/dt] = dq/dt [XA(q) - t - XB(q)] + XB’ dq/dt [Q(q) – q] + q [XA’ dq/dt - 1] < 0 .4 
Finally, the welfare of country B always increases when a tariff reduction takes place: 
[38] [dWB/dt]MB = dq/dt [XA(q) - t - XB(q)] + q [XA’ dq/dt - 1] < 0 . 
Conclusions 
The aim of the paper was to investigate how the effects of an agricultural trade liberalization 
change when market imperfections are present. Three extreme cases have been considered within 
a 
very simple analytical framework: the first involves an exporting country which intervenes to 
maximize its producer and consumer surplus, the second describes the situation where all 
international trading is controlled by one firm acting as a “pure middleman”, whereas the third considers the existence of a producer-owned marketing board which is given exclusive export 
authority. 
The results reached suggest that the impact in terms of prices and volume traded of a trade 
liberalization obtained assuming perfect competition will overestimate that occurring when this 
postulate does not hold. In addition, it has been proved that, when there exists a firm exerting 
both 
monopoly and monopsony power in the world market, it could well be that a system of direct 
transfers makes all countries better off with respect to a trade liberalization. 
Because of (a) the relevance of market imperfections in many internationally traded 
agricultural commodities, (b) the fact that perfect competition is assumed in most of the attempts 
to 
measure the effects of a reduction in the barriers to agricultural trade, and (c) the significant 
impact 
3 While the intercept of XB 
** 
is always smaller than that of XB , the excess supply function of country B, no ranking of 
the slopes of the two functions is, in general, possible; this means that, differently from the case depicted in Figure 4, 
XB and XB 
** could intersect. However, this does not affect the results derived in the paper. 
4 Note that XA’ dq/dt is always smaller than 1. 
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that such attempts may have on the on-going WTO negotiations, it would appear that the results 
of 
this paper might be of some interest. 
If a conclusion can be drawn, it is the need for further work involving a larger number of 
imperfect market structures, and a more realistic analytical setting. In spite of all the limitation of 
the present paper, its findings suggest caution at the bargaining table when evaluating the results 
of 
the simulations which assume that perfect competition obtains. 
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